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PRISONERS OF WAR UNDER THE 1977 PROTOCOL I
by
HOWARD S. LEVIE*
ARTICLE 1(4) OF THE Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Interna-
tional Armed Conflict (Protocol 1),1 bringing national liberation movements
within the ambit of the Protocol and thus making the conflicts in which
they engage international in scope, was probably the most controversial
provision adopted by the Diplomatic Conference which met in Geneva
from 1974 to 1977. However, Article 44, which implements Article 1(4),
has been the object of almost equal controversy.2 The purpose of this paper
is to determine whether the objections to that article were and are
justified?
*Professor Emeritus of Law, Saint Louis University Law School; former Stockton Professor of Inter-
national Law, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.; A.B., Cornell University (1928); J.D., Cornell
Law School (1930); LL.M., George Washington University Law School (1957).
' Swiss Federal Political Department, 1 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE
REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HuMANrrARAN LAW APPLICABLE IN INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICTS (Geneva, 1974-1977), Part One, 115 (1978) [hereinafter OFFICIAL RECORDS], U.N.
Doc. A/32/144, Annex 1 (1977), 72 A.J.I.L. 457 (1978), 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977). This Protocol was opened
for signature on December 12, 1977. As of 31 December 1988 there were 78 States Parties to it.
No member of the Warsaw Pact is a Party. Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, and Norway are the
only NATO countries which are Parties. The People's Republic of China is the only major military
power which is a Party.
2 The record of its negotiation covers 167 printed pages. 2 H. LEVIE, PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS:
PROTOCOL I TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS 378-545 (1980) [hereinafter PROTECTION]. The records
of the negotiations of only two other articles exceeded 100 pages, that of Article 85 covering 119
pages and that of Article 90 covering 101 pages. Strange to relate, Article 44 was ultimately ap-
proved in Committee III of the Diplomatic Conference by a vote of 66 for (including the United States),
and 2 against (Brazil and Israel), with 18 abstentions (including Canada, Italy, Japan, Spain, and
the United Kingdom). XV OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 1, at 155-56, 2 Protection, supra, at 486.
Forty-one delegations found it necessary to explain their votes. XV OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note
1, at 156-87, 2 PROTECTION, supra, at 486-512. It was approved by the Plenary Meeting of the
Diplomatic Conference by a vote of 73 for (including the United States), 1 against (Israel), and 21
abstentions (including Brazil as well as those mentioned above). VI OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note
1, at 121, 2 PROTECTION, supra, at 516. Once again a very large number of delegations found it
necessary to explain their votes. VI OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 1, at 121-55, 2 PROTECTION, supra,
at 516-44.
'In a talk delivered at a Symposium conducted at the University of Akron Law School in 1985 the
author listed this article as being one which was a step backward in the development of the law
of war. Levie, Pros and Cons of the 1977 Protocol I, 19 AKRON L. REV. 537 (1986). However, that was
a one-paragraph discussion - and even there issue was taken with one argument advanced against
it by the Reagan Administration!
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The XXIst International Conference of the Red Cross, held in Istan-
bul in September 1969, adopted a resolution requesting the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) "to pursue actively its efforts with
a view to proposing, as soon as possible, concrete rules which would sup-
plement the humanitarian law in force."4 A Conference of Government
Experts, sponsored by the ICRC, took place in Geneva in 1971. For the
second session of that conference the ICRC prepared a Draft Additional
Protocol to the Four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949.5 The rele-
vant portion of one article of that Draft stated:
Article 38. - Guerrilla fighters
1. In the event of their capture, members of militias
or volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance
or independence movements not belonging to the regular
armed forces but belonging to a Party to the conflict, even
in the case of a government or of an authority not recog-
nized by the Detaining Power, shall be treated as prisoners
of war within the meaning of the Third Convention, pro-
vided that such militias, volunteer corps or organized
resistance or independence movements fulfill the follow-
ing conditions:6
(a) that in their operations they comply with the re-
quirements of the principles of the law of armed
conflicts and of the rules laid down in the present
Protocol;
(b) that in their operations they show their comba-
tant status by openly displaying their weapons
or that they distinguish themselves from the
civilian population either by wearing a distinctive
sign or by any other means;
(c) that they are organized and under the orders of
a commander responsible for his subordinates.
4 Resolution XIII, REPORT OF THE XXIsT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE RED CROSS, Istanbul,
Sept. 1969, at 98.
'I CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMArrAmuA.N LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS, BASIC TEXTS 14 (1972) [hereinafter CONFERENCE
OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS].
'The French version of this provision used the term "autodetermination". "Self-determination" would
have been a better translation than "independence".
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It is to be noted that two of the four requirements of provisions of
the first three 1949 Geneva Conventions, those of having a distinctive
sign and of carrying arms openly, were included in paragraph 1(b), but
in the alternative. This caused considerable controversy at the Conference
of Government Experts at which it was discussed. The ICRC reported
that discussion as follows:
3.65. Sub-paragraph 1(b) of Article 38 was vigorously op-
posed by several experts who demanded, either by written
amendments or in the course of discussion,that it be re-
moved, while others called for a more flexible wording,
better suited to the special circumstances of the struggle.
Other experts, on the contrary, proposed a reinforcement
of the requirement that guerrilla fighters distinguish
themselves from civilians, and referred back to the terms
used at The Hague and Geneva in 1949 which stipulated
both the carrying of arms openly and the wearing of a
distinctive sign. Yet others agreed with the ICRC text,
which required only one or the other of those conditions
to be fulfilled, but proposed striking out the words "or by
any other means" as too vague. All three schools of thought
were concerned with the effectiveness of such requirements
for protecting civilians against the dangers of hostilities.
As an outgrowth of that discussion the ICRC prepared what became Ar-
ticle 42 of the Draft Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts? The relevant portions of that article provided:
Article 42. - New category of prisoners of war
1. In addition to the persons mentioned in Article 4
of the Third Convention, members of organized resistance
movements who have fallen into the hands of the enemy
6 U.S.T. 3114/3217/3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3362/3363/3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 31/85/135. These requirements
had originated in the 1874 Declaration of Brussels, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 26 (D. SCHINDLER
& J. TOMAN, eds., 2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter SCHINDLER & ToMAN]; and had reappeared in the Regula-
tions Attached to the 1899 Hague Convention II, 32 Stat. 1803, SCHINDLER & TOMAN at 57; in the
Regulations Attached to the 1907 Hague Convention IV 36 Stat. 2227, 2 A.J.I.L. 97 (Supp. 1908),
SCHINDLER & TOMAN at 57; and in the 1929 Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention, 47 Stat. 2074, 118
L.N.T.S. 303, 27 A.J.I.L. 43 (Supp. 1933), SCHINDLER & TOMAN at 271.
'CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS, supra note 5, REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE (2d
Sess. 1972) at 135.
'I OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 1, at Part Three, 13, 2 PROTECTION, supra note 2, at 378. This Draft
Protocol subsequently became the Working Document for the Diplomatic Conference.
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are prisoners of war provided such movements belong to a Par-
ty to the conflict, even if that Party is represented by a govern-
ment or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power,
and provided that such movements fulfill the following
conditions:
(a) that they are under a command responsible to a
Party to the conflict for its subordinates;
(b) that they distinguish themselves from the civilian
population in military operations;
(c) that they conduct their military operations in ac-
cordance with the Conventions and the present
Protocol.
*Note
If, as many Governments wished, the Diplomatic Con-
ference should decide to mention in the present Protocol
members of movements of armed struggle for self-determination,
a solution would be to include in this article a third paragraph
worded as follows:
3. In cases of armed struggle where peoples exercise their
right to self-determination as guaranteed by the United Nations
Charter and the "Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations," members
of organized liberation movements who comply with the
aforementioned conditions shall be treated as prisoners of war
for as long as they are detained.
The foregoing provisions are the basic sources of what evolved as
Article 44 of the 1977 Protocol I. An attempt will now be made to trace
the evolution of Article 42 of the Draft Additional Protocol into Article
44 of the 1977 Protocol I during the course of the discussions which took
place at the Diplomatic Conference and which required four annual ses-
sions, from 1974 to 1977, to accomplish its overall objective.
Article 44 of the 1977 Protocol I is entitled "Combatants and
prisoners of war." Its paragraphs 1 and 6 read as follows:1"
"o The article is set forth in its entirety in the Appendix.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:1
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1. Any combatant, as defined in Article 43, who falls
into the power of an adverse Party shall be a prisoner of
war.
6. This Article is without prejudice to the right of any
person to be a prisoner of war pursuant to Article 4 of the
Third Convention.
Article 43 of the Protocol, entitled "Armed forces" defines com-
batants as "members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict" other
than medical personnel and chaplains. As this provision is not as com-
prehensive as Article 4 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War," paragraph 6 was necessary in order to indicate
clearly that there was no intention to remove from entitlement to prisoner-
of-war status the categories of persons, other than combatants, specified
in the latter article as being so entitled. There does not appear to be
anything controversial in either of these paragraphs as they do no more
than reiterate long-standing rules.
Paragraph 2 of Article 44 states:
2. While all combatants are obliged to comply with
the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict,
violations of these rules shall not deprive a combatant of
his right to be a combatant, or if he falls into the power
of the adverse Party, of his right to be a prisoner of war,
except as provided in paragraphs 3 and 4.
Omitting for the moment all reference to the final clause of that
paragraph ("except as provided in paragraphs 3 and 4"), we find that if
an individual who is a combatant ("a member of the armed forces of a
Party to a conflict") falls into the power of the adverse Party, the fact
that he is alleged to have violated the laws of war does not deprive him
of his right to be a prisoner of war. Of course, he may be tried and con-
victed of a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions or of the 1977
Protocol I, or of any other war crime which he may have committed -
but, at least until that event,2 he is a prisoner of war and is entitled
I" 6 U.S.T 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
12 This limiting phrase is necessary because the Soviet Union and all of its satellites made a reser-
vation to Article 85 of the 1949 Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention under which, once tried and con-
victed of a war crime or a crime against humanity, the convicted prisoner of war becomes "subject
to the conditions obtaining in the country in question [the Detaining Power] for those who undergo
their punishment". The Soviet reservation may be found in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 7, at
516-18. For the reaction of the reserving nations to paragraph 2 of Article 44, see XV OFFICIAL RECORDS,
supra note 1, at 375, 402, 2 PROTECTION, supra note 2, at 482, 483-84.
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to all of the rights and protections provided by the 1949 Geneva Prisoner-
of-War Convention and by the 1977 Protocol I.
The argument is sometimes advanced that this provision, entitling
a combatant to prisoner-of-war status even though, prior to capture, he
has violated the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict,
was included in order to give additional protection to members of national
liberation movements, combatants not known for their steadfast com-
pliance with the law of war. But this provision is merely a reiteration
of already existing law. Moreover, it is so clear and unambiguous that,
although this was not the motivation for its drafting and adoption, it
should certainly make it far more difficult for the "law-defying nations"
to follow the formulae adopted by the North Koreans and the Chinese
Communists during the Korean hostilities and by the North Vietnamese
during the hostilities in Vietnam. North Korea and Communist China
contended that individuals captured by their armed forces, although they
were unquestionably members of the regular armed forces of the enemy,
were not entitled to prisoner-of-war status until they had repented their
misdeeds, the misdeeds not being specified but probably being the act
of fighting a communist nation's attempted extension of communism.13
North Vietnam followed a somewhat similar pattern, contending that
all members of the United States armed forces who were captured were
"pirates," major war criminals caught in flagrante delicto, who were not
entitled to the status of prisoners of war although no war crimes trials
were ever conducted.' 4 Once again, the "crime" in which they were alleged-
ly engaged when captured in flagrante delicto was apparently that of
fighting a communist nation's attempted extension of communism. While
Article 44(2) is no panacea, its provisions will make it considerably more
difficult for the three named countries, all of which have ratified the 1977
Protocol I without relevant reservation, to claim that a captured member
of the regular armed forces of the enemy is not a prisoner of war until
he "repents" or because, without a trial, he is administratively declared
13 After World War II the Soviet Union tried many prisoners of war in its custody for violation of
the humanitarian law of war by "supporting capitalism". H. LEVIE, PRISONERS OF WAR IN INTERNA-
TIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 351 n.36 (1978).
14 Levie, Remarks at the Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference
on International Humanitarian Law, 2 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 415, 534-35 (1987); Levie, Maltreat-
ment of Prisoners of War in Vietnam, 48 B.U.L. Rev. 323, 324 and 344-52 (1968), reprinted in 2 THE
VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 361 (R. Falk, ed., 1969). This appears to have continued to
be the position of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam during the course of the discussions on Arti-
cle 44. XIV OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 1, at 362-63, 2 PROTECTION, supra note 2, at 435. Moreover,
that country's delegation submitted a proposed amendment (later withdrawn) which would have
codified its procedure of denying prisoner-of-war status to "[p]ersons taken in fragrante delicto when
committing crimes against peace or crimes against humanity". III OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note
1, at 191, XIV id. at 464, 468, 2 PROTECTION, supra note 2, at 397, 400-01.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:1
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to be a war criminal, captured in flagrante delicto. Unfortunately, based
upon experience, one cannot be too optimistic in this respect. One can
expect that the mentioned nations, and others of their ilk, will either
claim that the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Protocol I are not
applicable, or will just disregard the provisions of those agreements, while,
perhaps, asserting that, nevertheless, the captured personnel receive
"humane treatment" - such "humane treatment" consisting of insuffi-
cient food, inadequate shelter, lack of medical treatment, torture, etc.
Now let us look at paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 44, the provisions
which provide the exception to the applicability of the rule of paragraph
2 entitling a combatant to prisoner-of-war status even if he has, prior
to capture, violated the law of war. These paragraphs state:
3. In order to promote the protection of the civilian
population from the effects of hostilities, combatants are
obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian popula-
tion while they are engaged in an attack or in a military
operation preparatory to an attack. Recognizing, however,
that there are situations in armed conflicts where, owing
to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant can-
not so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a
combatant, provided that, in such situations, he carries his
arms openly:
(a) during each military engagement, and
(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary
while he is engaged in a military deployment
preceding the launching of an attack in which
he is to participate.
Acts which comply with the requirements of this
paragraph shall not be considered as perfidious within the
meaning of Article 37, paragraph 1(c).'
4. A combatant who falls into the power of an
adverse Party while failing to meet the requirements set
forth in the second sentence of paragraph 3 shall forfeit
his right to be a prisoner of war, but he shall, nevertheless,
be given protections equivalent in all respects to those
'
5 The sentence with respect to perfidy was included at the demand of the representative from Tan-
zania who made it "a test case for African participation in the Conference and respect for Protocol
I". XV OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 1, at 101-21, 2 PROTECTION, supra note 2, at 466.
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accorded to prisoners of war by the Third Convention and
by this Protocol. This protection includes protections
equivalent to those accorded to prisoners of war by the
Third Convention in the case where such a person is tried
and punished for any offences he has committed.
It will be recalled that the article drafted by the ICRC for the use
of the second (1972) session of the Conference of Government Experts re-
quired individuals to comply with the law of war, to display their weapons
openly or to distinguish themselves from the civilian population by wear-
ing a distinctive sign, and to have a responsible commander;"s and that
the article drafted by the ICRC for the Draft Additional Protocol prepared
in 1973 required that there be a responsible command, that they
distinguish themselves from the civilian population, and that they com-
ply with the Conventions and the Protocol. 7 While Article 43 of the 1977
Protocol I still requires the responsible command (and an internal
disciplinary system which enforces compliance with the law of war), under
paragraph 3 of Article 44 the individual is no longer required to
distinguish himself from the civilian population; and he need only carry
his arms openly when actually engaged in hostilities and when visible
to the enemy during a military "deployment" for an attack.8
The requirements to carry arms openly and to distinguish oneself
from the civilian population had met with disfavor from the very opening
16 See page 30, supra.
17 See pages 31-32, supra.
." .The meaning of the word "deployment" has occasioned considerable difficulty. When the issue
was raised during the discussion of Committee III's 1976 Report, the Rapporteur said: "With regard
to deployment, he did not think it was possible to define the term 'military deployment' at the pre-
sent stage.' XV OFFI IAL RECORDS, supra note 1, at 135, 138, 2 PROTECTION, supra note 2, at 477,
479. In the final (1977) Report of Committee III the following statement appears:
20. The one question on which the explanations of vote revealed a clear difference
of opinion was the meaning of the term "deployment". Some delegations stated
that they understood it as meaning any movement toward a place from which
an attack was to be launched. Other delegations stated that it included only
a final movement to firing positions. Several delegations stated that they
understood it as covering only the moments immediately prior to attack.
Upon signing the Final Act of the Conference, the British delegation stated:
[T]he Government of the United Kingdom will interpret the word "deployment"
in paragraph 3(b) of the Article as meaning "any movement towards a place from
which an attack is to be launched".
SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 7, at 634, 635. The statement made by the United States at the
time of signing was as follows:
2. It is the understanding of the United States of America that the phrase
"military deployment preceding the launching of an attack" in Article 44,
Paragraph 3, means any movement towards a place from which an attack is to
be launched.
Id. at 636. Neither country has ratified the 1977 Protocol I.
AKRON LAW REVIEW (Vol. 23:1
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of the Diplomatic Conference. Thus, on March 27, 1974, during the First
Session of the Diplomatic Conference, and a year before Committee III
of the Diplomatic Conference began to discuss this article, Madagascar
and the South West African People's Organization had submitted a pro-
posed amendment to Article 42 of the Draft Additional Protocol. This pro-
posed amendment omitted paragraph 1(b) thereof, thus eliminating the
requirement to carry arms openly or to wear a distinctive sign.!9 A state-
ment by the representative of Lesotho is typical of the arguments ad-
vanced during the course of the discussion of that article in Committee
III. He said:
7. It must be noted that national liberation
movements are fighting for their people's right of self-
determination but, because of their material situation and
military inferiority in the field, combatants belonging to
those movements cannot wear distinctive signs or carry
arms openly. Experience shows that it is not difficult for
the enemy regime to identify national liberation com-
batants in battle. For these reasons paragraphs 1(b) and
(c) are not acceptable to my delegation. What is needed here
is a simple and explicit statement of international law pro-
viding protection to the members of a national liberation
movement who are engaged in armed conflict in pursuance
of their people's right of self-determination.P
In other words, members of national liberation movements should not
be required to carry their arms openly, should not be required to
distinguish themselves from the civilian population, and should not be
required to comply with the provisions of the Conventions and of the Pro-
tocol. Understandably, the speaker did not take exception to the provi-
sion requiring them to have a command responsible to a Party to the
conflict.
The representative of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would
have gone even further. He named two categories of individuals who
should be entitled to prisoner-of-war status upon capture: (1) members
of resistance movements; and (2) members of national liberation
movements. He then said:
'0 111 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 1, at 179, 2 PROTECTION, supra note 2, at 379-80. Paragraph 3
of this proposed amendment provided that violators of the Conventions and of the Protocol "even
if sentenced, shall retain the status of prisoners of war". This follows the provisions of Article 85
of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention, but is contrary to the reservation made to that article by
the Communist countries. See supra note 12.
'o XIV OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 1, at 499, 500, 2 PROTECTION, supra note 2, at 420-21.
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4. The sole difference between these two categories
would be as follows: The first category would have to fulfill
the condition of "visibility" that is to say "to distinguish
themselves from the civilian population in military opera-
tions" according to the terms of paragraph 1(b) of Article
42 of the ICRC draft, while the second category would be
exempt from that requirement. 1
Under this proposal paragraph 3(a) and (b) of Article 44 of the 1977 Pro-
tocol I, as ultimately adopted, would have been applicable to members
of resistance movements, but not to members of national liberation
movements.
To summarize, paragraph 3 of Article 44 of the 1977 Protocol I re-
quires combatants (as defined in Article 43) to distinguish themselves
from the civilian population "while they are engaged in an attack or in
a military operation preparatory to an attack." They will fulfill that re-
quirement if they carry their arms openly (a) during an actual military
engagement and (b) when visible to the enemy while in the course of a
military deployment preliminary to an attack. This appears to mean that
these combatants may merge with the crowd, weapons concealed, until
they are about to attack, at which time they move out of the crowd, disclose
their weapons, and begin their attack.
There seems little doubt but that the provisions of paragraph 3 of
Article 44 will increase the dangers to the civilian population. This posi-
tion would, of course, be disputed by those delegations at the Diplomatic
Conference which sought (successfully) to increase the protection given
to members of national liberation movements, denying that this was at
the expense of the civilian population. In the 1976 Report of Committee
III the Rapporteur (Ambassador Aldrich of the United States) included
this personal note:
94. In summary, the Rapporteur stated his conviction
that Article 42 [now 44] was a compromise - the greatest
possible increase in protection of guerrilla combatants at
the cost of some, but hopefully not unacceptable, loss of pro-
tection to the civilian population. Some representatives
agreed that one could not have one without the other. Other
representatives disagreed and felt that adequate protec-
tion could be assured to the civilian population.2
21 XIV OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 1, at 464, 2 PROTECTION, supra note 2, at 397.
22 XV OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 1, at 373, 404, 2 PROTECTION, supra note 2, at 482, 485.
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Under paragraph 4 of Article 44 a failure to comply with the provi-
sions of paragraph 3(a) and (b) results in a forfeiture of the right to
prisoner-of-war status upon capture - but, even so, the captured individual
remains entitled to protections equivalent to those afforded by the 1949
Third Geneva Convention. In other words, at his trial as an unlawful com-
batant he will be entitled to the judicial safeguards of the Convention.
With this there can be no quarrel. Presumably, as he is not a prisoner
of war, these protections will cease upon conviction and sentence.
Paragraph 5 of Article 44 of the 1977 Protocol I provides:
5. Any combatant who falls into the power of an
adverse Party while not engaged in an attack or in a
military operation preparatory to an attack shall not forfeit
his rights to be a combatant and a prisoner of war by vir-
tue of his prior activities.
Like a number of other paragraphs of Article 44, this one originated
in the Working Group, its subject matter not having been included in
any proposed amendment, nor having been raised during the discussions
in Committee III. At first glance it might appear that the intent was to
draft a provision similar to the one concerning spies contained in Arti-
cle 31 of the 1907 Hague Regulations23 (and in Article 46(4) of the 1977
Protocol 1). (A spy who rejoins his army after committing his act of es-
pionage is "home free" and cannot be punished for the act if he is
thereafter captured by the Party against whom the act of espionage was
conducted.) It might also mean that a combatant who fails to comply with
the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 44, but who is not captured until
a time subsequent to the illegal act, cannot be punished for his prior viola-
tion of the provisions of paragraph 3 (a) and (b). Further, it could mean
simply that he is entitled to the status of a prisoner of war - in which
case he could be tried and punished for the violation of paragraph 3 just
as persons entitled to the status of prisoner of war can be tried for other
violations of the law of war committed prior to capture. The only available
legislative history consists of a statement in Committee III's 1976 Report
which reads:
91. Paragraph 5 is an important innovation developed
within the Working Group. It would ensure that any com-
batant who is captured while not engaged in an attack or
a military operation preparatory to an attack retains his
rights as a combatant and a prisoner of war whether or
' 36 Stat. 2277, 2 A.J.I.L. 109 (Supp. 1908).
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not he may have violated in the past the rule of the sec-
ond sentence of paragraph 3. This rule should, in many
cases, cover the great majority of prisoners and will pro-
tect them from any efforts to find or fabricate past histories
to deprive them of their protection 4
In other. words, the individual who violates the provisions of
paragraph 3, but is only captured at some subsequent point in time, not
involving the conditions of that paragraph, is entitled to prisoner-of-war
status; but he may be tried for the prior violation of the paragraph, or,
for that matter, for any other prior violation of the law of war. This is
an attempt to prevent the Capturing Power from administratively deter-
mining that an individual is not entitled to be a prisoner of war because
of an alleged prior violation of paragraph 3 of Article 44. It will be noted
that the rule only applies if the capture does not involve the provisions
of paragraph 3. Does this mean that if an individual is captured during
the course of a subsequent attack, where the provisions of paragraph 3
have been complied with, he does not come within the saving provisions
of paragraph 5 and he may be denied prisoner-of-war status on the basis
of an alleged prior violation of the provisions of paragraph 3? This pro-
bably was not the intention of the drafters, but it is a logical interpreta-
tion of the provision.
Paragraph 7 of Article 44 states:
7. This article is not intended to change the general-
ly accepted practice of States with respect to the wearing
of the uniform by combatants assigned to the regular,
uniformed armed units of a Party to the conflict.
It might be thought that this provision was included in order to pro-
vide some protection for the regular armed forces of a Government in
a conflict with a national liberation movement. Not so! As has surely
become obvious the entire tenor of the discussions at the Diplomatic Con-
ference was directed towards creating an imbalance in favor of the
members of national liberation movements. This provision was included
to ensure that regular troops would not be ordered by their commanders
to remove their uniforms and, wearing civilian clothes, lose themselves
in the civilian population in their search for members of a national libera-
tion movement 5
14 XV OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 1, at 373, 404, 2 PROTECTION, supra note 2, at 482, 484.
Paragraph 84 of Committee III's 1976 Report (XV OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 1, at 373, 401,
2 PROTECTION, supra note 2, at 482, 483) includes a statement to the effect that "this concept of
a single standard gave rise to certain problems, particularly concern that we should not develop
a rule that would encourage uniformed regular soldiers to dress in civilian clothes."
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Finally, paragraph 8 of Article 44 provides:
8. In addition to the categories of persons mentioned
in Article 13 of the First and Second Conventions, all
members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as
defined in Article 43 of this Protocol, shall be entitled to
protection under those Conventions if they are wounded
or sick or, in the case of the Second Convention, ship-
wrecked at sea or in other waters.
The 1976 Report of Committee II correctly describes this provision
as a "technical addition which seemed desirable to ensure that persons
whose entitlement to PW status comes only from Article 42" [now Arti-
cle 44] are entitled to the protection of the provisions of the first two 1949
Geneva Conventions 6
A number of the provisions of the 1977 Protocol I, including particular-
ly those of Article 1(4) and Article 44, have caused much soul-searching
in the Executive Department of the United States Government. In depth
studies of these provisions have probably been made by each of the armed
services. A lengthy, classified study was made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff'7
while similar studies have been made by the Departments of State,
Defense, and Justice, etc. The final result of these studies has been that
the Executive Department has concluded that the United States should
not become a Party to the 1977 Protocol I. Article 44 is one of the major
causes of the problem.
In transmitting the 1977 Protocol 1128 to the President with the
recommendation that it be sent to the Senate for the latter's advice and
consent to ratification, but that this not be done with respect to the 1977
Protocol I, the Secretary of State said:
Our extensive interagency [State, Defense and
Justice] review of the Protocol has, however, led us to con-
clude that Protocol I suffers from fundamental shortcom-
ings that cannot be remedied through reservations or
26 XV OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 1, at 373, 404, 2 PROTECTION, supra note 2, at 482, 484-85.
27 Reference is made to this study in the Secretary of State's letter to the President, transmitting
the 1977 Protocol II with the recommendation that it be forwarded to the Senate for the latter's
advice and consent to ratification. See notes 28 and 29, infra. Rumor has it that the report of the
Joint Chiefs recommended that, if the United States were to ratify the 1977 Protocol I, it should
only do so with more than 20 reservations and more than 20 understandings!
2 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 11), Dec 12, 1977, 1 OFFICIAL RECORDS,
supra note 1, Part I, at 185, U.N. Doc. A132/144, 15 August 1977, Annex H; 72 A.J.I.L. 502 (1978).
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understandings. We therefore must recommend that Pro-
tocol I not be forwarded to the Senate. The following is a
brief summary of the reasons for our conclusion.
In key respects Protocol I would undermine
humanitarian law and endanger civilians in war....
Equally troubling is the easily inferred political and
philosophical intent of Protocol I, which aims to encourage
and give legal sanction not only to 'national liberation'
movements in general, but in particular to the inhumane
tactics of many of them. Article 44(3), in a single sub-
ordinate clause, sweeps away years of law by 'recognizing'
that an armed irregular 'cannot' always distinguish himself
from non-combatants; it would grant combatant status to
such an irregular anyway. As the essence of terrorist
criminality is the obliteration of the distinction between
combatants and non-combatants, it would be hard to square
ratification of this Protocol with the United States'
announced policy of combatting terrorism. 9
In submitting the 1977 Protocol H and the Secretary of State's let-
ter to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, President
Reagan made the following statement with respect to Article 44 of the
1977 Protocol I:
Another provision would grant combatant status to
irregular forces even if they do not satisfy the traditional
requirements to distinguish themselves from the civilian
population and otherwise comply with the laws of war. This
would endanger civilians among whom terrorists and other
irregulars attempt to conceal themselves. These problems
are so fundamental in character that they cannot be
remedied through reservations and I therefore have decided
not to submit the Protocol to the Senate?
It is believed that the emphasis placed on terrorists and terrorism
in connection with Article 44 of the 1977 Protocol I is a mistake, both
legally and philosophically. Article 44 can only be considered as pro-
29 S Treaty Doc. No. 100-2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. ix (1987).
'o Id. at iv, reprinted in 81 A.J.I.L. 910, 911 (1987).
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tecting terrorists if it is assumed that all members of national libera-
tion movements are ipso facto terrorists?1 When terrorists operate, they
do not "deploy," under any definition of that term; and they do everything
possible to avoid confrontation with armed forces (or police) while engaged
in their acts of terrorism. When members of national liberation
movements merge with the civilian population, they do not do so in order
to take members of the civilian population hostages as is the case with
the several pro-Iranian terrorist groups based in Lebanon, nor to commit-
hit-and-run acts of violence against members of the civilian population
as is the case with the PLO in Israel, with the IRA in Ireland, and with
other terrorist groups operating around the world. These groups merge
with the civilian population solely in order to avoid being identified so
that they may live to fight another day. The present author does not con-
done that practice which, inevitably, increases the danger that members
of the civilian population will be engulfed in the hostilities despite their
noncombatant status. However, that does not make terrorists out of
members of national liberation movements. While courts have, on occa-
sion, held that when terrorist groups engage in acts of terrorism they
are engaged in a political activity, no court has ever held that they were
engaged in a legal military activity. It is also extremely doubtful that
such terrorist groups are ever "subject to an internal disciplinary system
which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international
law applicable in armed conflict," as required by Article 43(1) of the 1977
Protocol I. Raising the issue of protection of terrorists in connection with
Article 44, and arguing that on that basis ratification of the 1977 Pro-
tocol I would be contrary to the U.S. program of combatting terrorism,
gives the impression that there is a need to buttress other reasons for
not ratifying the Protocol. There may well be good reasons for such a deci-
sion based on other provisions of the Protocol but the public image of
31 One of the Reagan Administration's chief opponents of the ratification by the United States of
the 1977 Protocol I asserts, in effect, that the sole object of this document is to protect terrorists.
Feith, Protocol I: Moving Humanitarian Law Backwards, 19 AKRON L. REV. 531 (1986). Contrary
to his oft-repeated statements, the word "terrorism" does not appear anywhere in the Protocol. The
only two references to terrorism found in the legislative history occur in the 1976 Report of Com-
mittee III which states, with respect to paragraph 4: "Several representatives made the point that
this paragraph is not, in any event, intended to protect terrorists who act clandestinely to attack
the civilian population." XV OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 1, at 373, 403, 2 PROTECTION, supra note
2, at 482, 484, and when, in explaining the U.S. vote, the head of the U.S. delegation, Ambassador
Aldrich, said: "The article conferred no protection on terrorists." VI OFFcIAL RECORDS, supra note
1, at 149, 2 PRaOrECTIoN, supra note 2, at 535, 536.
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the United States is not helped by presenting poor ones - and the ter-
rorist argument falls in the latter category?2
CONCLUSION
During the course of the debate in Committee III of the Diplomatic
Conference on the article that eventually became Article 44 of the 1988
Protocol I, the representative of Norway made a statement worthy of
repetition. He said:
10. Before concluding my statement I would like to
recall three essential conditions which must be fulfilled
in order that the system of international humanitarian law
applicable in armed conflicts may function in practice.
First, the legal rules in question must place the Parties
to the conflict on an equal footing; second, the legal rules
must represent a well-balanced compromise between
humanitarian considerations and military necessity and,
third, the rules must be drafted in such a manner as to
ensure that all Parties to the conflict have an equal interest
in their application?3
The analysis just completed of the provisions of Article 44 of the
1977 Protocol I indicates that several of those provisions fail to meet some
or all of the three conditions enumerated. However, it is not believed that
this fact alone should make that article a basis for a refusal by the United
States to ratify the 1977 Protocol I. That difficulty could be overcome by
a simple reservation to the effect that the United States will not recognize
as a legal combatant, entitled to prisoner-of-war status, any individual
who fails to comply with the provisions of Article 4A(2) of the 1949 Geneva
Prisoner-of-War Convention. (That article sets forth the four historical re-
quirements for an individual to be a legal combatant and to be entitled
to prisoner-of-war status upon capture.) Any country which believes that
such a reservation is contrary to the object and purpose of the Protocol
32 It is interesting to note that in a recent article setting forth the rationale of the United States
decision not to ratify the 1977 Protocol I, the Legal Adviser of the Department of State discussed
Article 44 with only a passing mention of the problem of terrorism. Sofaer, Agora: The US. Deci-
sion Not to Ratify Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War Victims Cont'd., 82
A.J.I.L. 784-87 (1988). For well-presented arguments as to why the 1977 Protocol I, including Arti-
cle 44, should not be ratified by the United States, see Roberts, The New Rules for Waging War:
the Case Against Ratification of Additional Protocol 1, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 109, 127-34 (1985); for equally
well-presented arguments as to why the 1977 Protocol I, including Article 44, should be ratified
by the United States, see Aldrich, Progressive Development of the Law of War: a Reply to Criticisms
of the 1977 Protocol I, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 693, 703-08 (1986).
" XIV OFFICIAL REcoRDs, supra note 1, at 480, 482, 2 PROrECTION, supra note 2, at 408, 409.
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need only state that it does not consider itself bound as regards the United
States - thereby clearly indicating its position that the real object and
purpose of the 1977 Protocol I was to establish protection for members
of national liberation movements by eliminating century-old requirements
for legal combatants. Some of the African countries might do so because
the support of national liberation movements is the core of their foreign
policy. A few of the Asian countries might likewise do so as an indica-
tion of support for the African countries. It is doubtful that, should they
decide to ratify the 1977 Protocol I, the Soviet Union or any of the other
Communist countries would feel that the disadvantages of not support-
ing countries which they are courting would outweigh the advantages
of participation by the United States.
This paper should not be considered as a recommendation that the
United States ratify the 1977 Protocol I. It is merely a recommendation
that if the United States continues to decline to ratify the Protocol, it
should reach that decision on some basis other than the argument that
Article 44 protects terrorists.
Appendix
Article 44 - Combatants and prisoners of war
1. Any combatant, as defined in Article 43, who falls into the power
of an adverse Party shall be a prisoner of war.
2. While all combatants are obliged to comply with the rules of in-
ternational law applicable in armed conflict, violations of these rules shall
not deprive a combatant of his right to be a combatant, or if he falls into
the power of the adverse Party, of his right to be a prisoner of war, except
as provided in paragraphs 3 and 4.
3. In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from
the effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves
from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or in
a military operation preparatory to an attack. Recognizing, however, that
there are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the
hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself, he shall
retain his status as a combatant, provided that, in such situations, he
carries his arms openly:
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(a) during each military engagement, and
(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary
while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding
the launching of an attack in which he is to par-
ticipate.
4. A combatant who falls into the power of an adverse Party while
failing to meet the requirements set forth in the second sentence of
paragraph 3 shall forfeit his right to be a prisoner of war, but he shall,
nevertheless, be given protections equivalent in all respects to those ac-
corded to prisoners of war by the Third Convention and by this Protocol.
This protection includes protections equivalent to those accorded to
prisoners of war by the Third Convention in the case where such a per-
son is tried and punished for any offenses he has committed.
5. Any combatant who falls into the power of an adverse Party while
not engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an
attack shall not forfeit his rights to be a combatant and a prisoner of
war by virtue of his prior activities.
6. This Article is without prejudice to the right of any person to
be a prisoner of war pursuant to Article 4 of the Third Convention.
7. This article is not intended to change the generally accepted prac-
tice of States with respect to the wearing of the uniform by combatants
assigned to the regular, uniformed armed units of a Party to the conflict.
8. In addition to the categories of persons mentioned in Article 13
of the First and Second Convention, all members of the armed forces of
a Party to the conflict, as defined in Article 43 of this Protocol, shall be
entitled to protection under those Conventions if they are wounded or
sick or, in the case of the Second Convention, shipwrecked at sea or in
other waters.
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